O  T  H  E  R      D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  S  :

PDC-El Paso Meriden, LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 2007 WL 756456 (Mass. Super.)
(Jan. 2, 2007) (van Gestel, J.).

In this case, Judge van Gestel reminds litigants that an award of attorney’s fees and costs under G.L. c. 231, § 6F is a rarity. The case involved a dispute over an alleged contract. Summary judgment was entered for defendants and was upheld on appeal. Defendants then moved for fees and costs, claiming that plaintiffs’ claims were “wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith.”

The court began its analysis with the observation that the SJC “disfavors fee awards.” Id. at *2. Even when exceptions

Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. O’Connell, 2007 WL 756505 (Mass. Super.)
(Jan. 2, 2007) (van Gestel, J.).

Judge van Gestel rejected defendant’s application (styled as a motion to dismiss) to vacate an arbitration award. MassMutual claimed that the underlying award violated public policy.

The court noted the strong public policy in Massachusetts favoring arbitration as an alternative to litigation, and the reluctance of courts to interfere with an arbitration award. Indeed, “judicial review of an arbitration award is among the narrowest known to law.” Id. at *4. An arbitration award may only be overturned for corruption, illegality, errors in procedure, or conflict with public policy; the mere fact that an arbitrator made an error of law or fact is not a proper basis for vacating the award. Id. Moreover, to meet the public policy exception, “the public policy in question must be well defined and dominant and must be ascertained by reference to laws

and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Id. at *5.

While conceding that “many may be appalled at the way America’s corporate executives are compensated and at the lifestyles they assume are their due,” the court found that no public policy had been shown here that was sufficiently well-defined as to justify vacating the arbitration award. Id. at *6. The matter was simply “a private tug-of-war, over money, created, facilitated and dominated by a contract between participants in the scrum.” Id. Nor was there any basis in the record to support defendant’s challenge to the impartiality of one of the arbitrators – for the arbitrator’s qualification were re-affirmed by the American Arbitration Association, and the record contained no indicia of partiality or bias.

Scotland Drive, LLC v. Tosi, 2007 WL 881661 (Mass. Super.)
(Feb. 28, 2007) (van Gestel, J.).

The court’s denial of a request to appoint a receiver in this intra-family dispute offers a discussion of the standards for the appointment. “A receivership must be thoroughly justified by the facts, is always to be considered a remedy of last resort, and therefore is .

 not often applied in practice. The test is one of reasonableness in the circumstances. In general, the more indurated the problems and less likely that intermediate steps will work, the greater the justification for a receivership.” Id. at *3.