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Brooks Automation,
Inc. v. Blueshift Technologies, Inc., 21 Mass. L. Rep.
53, 2006
Mass. Super. LEXIS 238 (April 6, 2006) (Gants,
J.). |
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In January 2006 (see last quarter’s
Session Watch), Judge Gants held that Plaintiff had
violated Chapter 93A by bringing a frivolous action
motivated by the desire to interfere with Blueshift’s
developing contractual relationship with a competitor.
As a prevailing party under Chapter 93A, Blueshift
Technologies was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
This decision addresses Blueshift’s application for
approximately $875,000 in fees and about $88,000 in
costs. Brooks Automation challenged the fees and costs
as unreasonably high. The Court awarded Blueshift all
but $25,000 of the requested fees and every cent of the
requested costs.
In reaching its decision, the Court
thoroughly addressed each of the several factors
identified in Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass.
381 (1979). The fees sought exceeded by a considerable
margin (about $250,000) the treble damages awarded under
Chapter 93A. The Court reasoned that although in
isolation the fees do not appear reasonable, the case
was a “bet the company” type of case that needed to be
tried on an expedited basis because the Plaintiff’s
lawsuit threatened Blueshift’s ability to obtain venture
capital financing. Thus, the damage award was not a true
reflection of the value of the case. In the same vein,
the Court held that the threat |
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posed by Plaintiff’s lawsuit warranted
Blueshift retaining a large national firm with rates
perhaps higher than necessary for the type of action.
The Court reasoned that although a small, local firm
could have handled the case and achieved a comparable
result, a larger firm with more resources was essential
to bringing the case to a trial swiftly, which was
critical to Blueshift’s existence. Even though all of
counsel’s rates were high, they were comparable to the
rates charged by other national firms with Boston
offices. To conclude that the rates were unreasonable
simply because they were large or expensive, the Court
reasoned, would be “a moral judgment, not a market
judgment,” akin to a fan’s complaint that a utility
infielder should not be paid $1.5 million.
The lone reduction in Blueshift’s fee
application related to $75,000 incurred in connection
with a summary judgment motion submitted immediately
prior to trial. The Court held that counsel should have
recognized that in light of the extremely expedited
schedule the Court likely would not consider a
complicated summary judgment motion. The Court
estimated, however, that roughly two thirds of the
$75,000 spent on the summary judgment motion overlapped
with trial preparation and therefore reduced the fee
award by only $25,000.
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