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Galvin v.
Jaffe, 25 Mass. L. Rep. 274, 2009 WL 884605
(March 25, 2009) (Neel, J.). |
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This opinion is likely to bring back bad
memories of first year law school civil procedure, as it
concerns the scope of the Massachusetts Secretary of
State’s subpoena powers. The Secretary commenced an
investigation into the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme
(insofar as it reached Massachusetts investors) and
pursuant to Chapter 110A issued a subpoena to Jaffe, a
Florida resident, to appear in Massachusetts to testify
on representations allegedly made by Jaffe to Madoff
victims. Jaffe challenged the subpoena, primarily on
personal jurisdiction grounds. Jaffe also challenged the
sufficiency of the subpoena under Chapter 110A, the
Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act.
The Court held that Jaffe was foreclosed
from contesting jurisdiction in |
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Massachusetts because in 1989, when he
completed his application to become a registered
investment advisor in Massachusetts (Form U-4), he
consented to jurisdiction in the Commonwealth and to
comply with any orders of the Secretary. The Court
further held that even if he did not consent to
jurisdiction through his U-4, the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Secretary and the Commonwealth did
not violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Court applied the traditional minimum contacts test
of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985), and held that Jaffe’s business dealings in
Massachusetts clearly met that standard.
Although this case is relatively narrow
in its application, it does serve as a helpful primer on
personal jurisdiction principles in Massachusetts.
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