O  T  H  E  R      D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  S  :

DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, 2007 WL 1418507 (Mass. Super.)
(April 17, 2007) (van Gestel, J.).

Plaintiff DePuy Spine sought a preliminary injunction to enforce a non-compete and secrecy agreement against defendants Ross and Stryker Biotech. Defendants acknowledged that a non-compete agreement had been signed, but argued that Ross would not be called upon to use any confidential information obtained during his previous employment at DePuy Spine in connection with his new position at Stryker.

The court emphasized “that non-competition covenants or agreements, although enforceable in Massachusetts, are exceptions to the general rule.” Id. at *3. Such an agreement is enforceable “only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably

limited in time and space, and consonant with the public interest.” Id. at *4. Legitimate business interests include protection of trade secrets, confidential information, and good will – but they do not include protection from ordinary competition. Id.

Applying this analytical framework to the limited record before it, the court declined to enjoin Ross from commencing employment with Stryker. However, the court did enjoin Ross from disclosing any confidential information obtained from DePuy Spine or from being involved in the development and marketing of certain new products at Stryker. The injunction was to remain in effect for four months or until modified by the court.

Kelen v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 2007 WL 1418510 (Mass. Super.)
(May 3, 2007) (van Gestel, J.).

Plaintiffs asserted a range of constitutional challenges to the Commonwealth’s policy of charging discounted toll rates to local residents who use the Ted Williams Tunnel and Tobin Memorial Bridge. However weighty these challenges may have sounded in theory, the court found them insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in practice.

The plaintiffs’ specific claims were that the discounts offered to residents living in the vicinity of the tunnel and bridge violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Even though plaintiffs only needed to “surmount a minimal hurdle to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” the court found that even this slight burden was too much for plaintiffs to overcome. On the Equal Protection claim, plaintiffs failed to allege that the Commonwealth employed any suspect classification in awarding

discounts. Nor did the plaintiffs allege that the program placed an unlawful burden on their right to enter and leave the Commonwealth, or that it impeded travel as its primary objective. Thus, no fundamental rights were implicated. Moreover, the program was rationally related to the permissible goal of mitigating adverse impacts on the roadways’ host communities. Id. at *3-4. These considerations justified dismissal of both the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities claims. Id. at *5.

As for the Commerce Clause claims, plaintiffs failed to allege that the toll program had any impact at all on interstate commerce. “The toll gates are not situated around the borders of Massachusetts, but instead are located in central locations in and around Boston. These tolls do not prevent any person access to the Commonwealth. Any burden on interstate commerce here is negligible, if it exists at all.” Id. at *7.