A quarterly summary and brief analysis of significant decisions issued by the Massachusetts Superior Court Business Litigation Session. A service of O’Connor, Carnathan and Mack LLC.
 

February 2008

Volume 4
Number 2
Page 2

 

Summarizing opinions from April 1, 2007 through
June 30, 2007

 

 


 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 


 

 

     

O  T  H  E  R      D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  S  :

Rhodes Technologies v. Copley Pharmaceuticals, 2007 WL 1302626 (Mass. Super.)
(April 4, 2007) (van Gestel, J.).

     

In a breach of contract action, the court deter-mined the meaning of the term “final disposition.” The parties had an agreement providing for an equal division of proceeds from any fraud action by Copley against SKB, commenced “following final disposition, settlement or resolution” of a pending patent action by Copley against SKB.

Copley commenced a fraud action against SKB after obtaining judgment in the patent action but before resolution of SKB’s appeal. Copley and SKB subsequently reached a settlement agreement with respect to both the patent and fraud claims.

On a motion for summary judgment, Rhodes contended that entry of judgment in the patent action was “final disposition,” entitling it to a 50% share of the proceeds of the fraud settlement. Copley argued that there was no final disposition while SKB’s appeal was pending, and that Rhodes was entitled to nothing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

 

The court first considered whether “final disposition” was an ambiguous term – i.e., whether “the phraseology can support reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the words employed and the obligations undertaken.” Id. at *3. Judge van Gestel found no ambiguity. “The phrase ‘final disposition when referring to a lawsuit means the final determination of the lawsuit. It is different from the phrase ‘final judgment.’ … There having been a timely appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Patent Action remained until that appeal was resolved.” Id. at *4. In order to guard against the possibility of judicial error on this question, the court proceeded to assume for the sake of assessment that the term was ambiguous and to supply its own reasonable definition. The court again concluded that “final disposition” means final determination, including resolution of any appeals. Id. at *5. Copley therefore owed nothing to Rhodes under the terms of the agreement, and was entitled to summary judgment on the claims against it..


 
 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 


 



 

 

 
     
     
 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 


 

Adam Associates International, Inc., v. William A. Berry & Son, Inc., 2007 WL 1296879 (Mass. Super.) (May 2, 2007) (Gants, J.).

     

Adam made a demand for arbitration against Berry pursuant to the terms of a letter agreement between the parties. The agreement provided that claims in excess of $500,000 would be decided by a specialized three-member panel of arbitrators, but also provided that Berry’s liability for compensatory damages would be limited to $250,000. The arbitrators found these provisions to be ambiguous, considered parol evidence and concluded

 

 

 

 

 

that the $250,000 cap applied only to damages for breach of warranty, and did not serve to limit disgorgement damages for breach of a non-compete provision of the agreement. Berry moved to vacate an award rendered pursuant to this interpretation, claiming that the panel exceeded its authority in making such an award. Judge Gants emphasized the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration awards and deferred to the arbitration panel.
 

 

 

 


 


 

 
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