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Virtually every lawsuit in Massachusetts seems to include a Chapter 93A claim.

Bliss Valley Properties, LLC v. Eliopulos, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 291
(June 2, 2005) (van Gestel, J.).

The Court dismissed a large part of the claims brought in a blunderbuss action against numerous defendants. The complaint alleged at its heart that the “defendants . . . [came] together in a countrywide conspiracy to defeat the plaintiffs’ ability to recover” on a $5 million judgment in favor of the assignees of the bankruptcy estate of the failed Boston law firm Gaston & Snow for legal fees owed by some of Gaston & Snow’s former clients. The Court considered a variety of claims including civil conspiracy, defamation and violation of M.G.L. ch. 93A.

The case states at least two clear, and useful, legal propositions: (1) “absent some extraordinary pleading concession by a claimant,” the Court will not be receptive to a motion to dismiss a Chapter 93A claim on the ground that the challenged conduct did not occur primarily and substantially in the Commonwealth; and (2) Massachusetts attorneys enjoy an absolute privilege against liability for defamation, tortious interference, or similar claims arising out of “statements made . . . in the institution or conduct of litigation or in conferences and other communications preliminary to litigation.”

DSF Investors, LLC v. Lyme Timber Co., 19 Mass. L. Rep. 409, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 282  (May 11, 2005) (Botsford, J.).

Lyme Timber Company asserted in a counterclaim that the plaintiffs had committed unfair and deceptive acts by falsely representing that DSF would include Lyme as a partner in a building development project in Cambridge. The Court previously awarded summary judgment to the DSF on the Lyme’s counterclaim of intentional misrepresentation, finding that Lyme had not relied upon the challenged statements. A term sheet between the parties expressly stated that there would be no binding agreement between the parties unless they executed a written contract. Because reliance is not an element of a Chapter 93A claim, however, the Court separately considered whether

Lyme could prove damages on its Chapter 93A claim.

Lyme sought the benefit of its alleged bargain as its measure of damages and declined to offer reliance damages. The Court held that where the term sheet disavowed any partnership, the parties negotiated for months, and Lyme ultimately did not invest in the project, the only losses it could reasonably have incurred were the value of its services and advice while laboring under the alleged deception. Benefit-of-the-bargain damages would be disproportionate to this loss. Because Lyme was not entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages and declined to pursue reliance damages, the Court entered summary judgment on its Chapter 93A claim.